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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4494
___________
ALAN N. SCOTT,
Appellant
v.
SCHUYKILL FCI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-01790)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 23, 2008
Before: BARRY, SMITH and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed November 3, 2008)
_________
OPINION

_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Alan N. Scott appeals from the order of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 as moot because of Scott’s release from incarceration.
Scott filed a § 2241 petition on September 13, 2006, claiming that the Bureau of

Prisons (BOP) denied him due process with respect to a prison disciplinary proceeding
conducted pursuant to an incident report dated June 4, 2001. He alleges that the incident
report was based on hearsay, not personal knowledge, and he disputes whether the “onesided” verbal altercation for which he was disciplined constituted “fighting with another
person” under prison regulations. Scott also asserts that he never saw the evidence
against him. He seeks the restoration of 27 days of good conduct time and the
expungement of his disciplinary record.
At the time he filed the § 2241 petition, Scott was serving a 96-month term of
imprisonment following his conviction in the District of Massachusetts on numerous
counts of bank fraud and related identity theft offenses. He was incarcerated at the
Federal Correctional Institution Schuykill (FCI-Schuykill) in Minersville, Pennsylvania.
On September 29, 2006, during the pendency of the § 2241 proceedings, the BOP
released Scott from custody. He was transferred to the custody of the United States
Marshal on a pre-trial detainer pursuant to an indictment filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, charging him with mail fraud that occurred in
the 1990’s.1
The BOP responded, asserting that the § 2241 petition should be dismissed as
moot because Scott had completed serving his prison sentence. Citing United States v.

1

See United States v. Scott, Crim. A. No. 06-00731 (E. D. N. Y.). During the
pendency of this appeal, on April 29, 2008, the United States District Court in the Eastern
District of New York sentenced Scott in both of his pending criminal cases to thirty-two
months in prison.
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Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000), the Magistrate Judge recommended that Scott’s petition be
denied as moot. The Magistrate Judge found that Scott’s good time credits could not be
restored because he had completed serving his term of imprisonment. The Magistrate
Judge rejected, as entirely speculative, Scott’s contention that he demonstrated collateral
consequences based on a possible future sentence of imprisonment in the Eastern District
of New York. Scott objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Report.
On June 18, 2007, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania overruled Scott’s objections, adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
dismissed the § 2241 petition as moot. Scott’s timely filed Objections crossed in the mail
with the District Court’s order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and dismissing the
petition as moot. Scott moved for reconsideration based on his objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report; the court denied the motion in an order entered on November
9, 2007. Scott appeals.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Upon de novo
review of the record and careful consideration of Scott’s response to the notice of possible
summary action, we conclude that no substantial question is presented on appeal and that
summary action is warranted. See LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
“Once the convict’s sentence has expired, some concrete and continuing injury
other than the now-ended incarceration or parole - some ‘collateral consequence’ of the
conviction - must exist if the suit is to be maintained.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998). A presumption of collateral consequences arising from a wrongful criminal
3

conviction exists in cases where a habeas petitioner challenges the legality of his criminal
conviction. But the Court has not extended this presumption to cases where the habeas
petitioner attacks a prison sentence that has been completed. United States v. Jackson,
523 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2008). Thus, Scott’s § 2241 petition challenging the execution
of his prison sentence was moot upon his release from imprisonment unless he can
demonstrate some “collateral consequence” that persists beyond the sentence’s expiration
and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523
U.S. at 7.
Scott’s § 2241 petition is moot because it is not redressable by a favorable judicial
decision. By the time the District Court had rendered its decision, Scott’s sentence had
ended and his supervised release had begun. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (2000) (“The term
of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment”).
Good time credits affect the timing of an inmate’s conditional release from prison, but
they do not alter the sentence itself. Thus, once Scott served the entire term of
imprisonment and was released upon its completion, his good time credits ceased to have
any effect. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.35(b); see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.2(c). His assertion that his
discipline for “fighting with another person” may adversely affect his future classification
is too speculative to demonstrate collateral consequences, nor can his complaint be
remedied during his second incarceration.
Accordingly, the District Court judgment is summarily affirmed. Scott’s motion
for a stay of the appeal is denied.
4

